








We	 often	 think	 or	 say	 that	 someone	 was	 wrong	 about	 something	 but	 almost	 right	
about	it	or	close	to	the	truth.	This	can	mean	more	than	one	thing.	Here,	I	propose	an	
analysis	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 being	 epistemically	 close	 to	 the	 truth.	 This	 idea	 plays	 an	
important	 role	 in	 our	 practice	 of	 epistemic	 evaluation	 and	 therefore	 deserves	 some	
detailed	 attention.	 I	 start	 (section1)	with	 an	 exposition	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 getting	 things	
right	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 main	 forms	 of	 reliabilism	 about	 true	 belief	 and	 belief	
acquisition.	 The	 focus	 on	 reliabilism	 is	 justified	 because	 (almost)	 everyone	 is	 a	
reliabilist	in	a	basic	sense.	Section	2	develops	a	notion	of	closeness	to	the	truth	in	two	
steps.	Section	3	mentions	some	ways	in	which	this	notion	is	useful,	one	having	to	do	
with	the	Gettier	problem.		
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We	often	think	or	say	that	someone	was	wrong	about	something	but	almost	right	about	
it	or	close	to	the	truth.	This	can	mean	more	than	one	thing.1	Here,	I	will	propose	an	
analysis	of	the	idea	of	being	epistemically	close	to	the	truth.2	This	idea	plays	an	
important	role	in	our	practice	of	epistemic	evaluation	and	therefore	deserves	some	
detailed	attention.	I	will	start	(section1)	with	an	exposition	of	the	idea	of	getting	things	
right	by	looking	at	the	main	forms	of	reliabilism	about	true	belief	and	belief	acquisition.	
This	is	a	necessary	preparation	for	the	next	steps.	The	focus	on	reliabilism	is	justified	
because	(almost)	everyone	is	a	reliabilist	in	a	basic	sense	(see	Author).	Section	2	
	
1	 For	related	issues	see,	e.g.,	Sorensen	2016.		
2	 I	will	thus	not	go	much	at	all	into	the	topic	of	truthlikeness	(see,	e.g.,	Oddie	2016).	This	notion	can	
be	explained	or	construed	in	several	different	ways	the	details	of	which	need	not	concern	us	
here.	But	one	can	give	some	ostensive	definitions	or	examples.	For	instance,	an	utterance	of	“It		is	
3pm	now”	when	it	is	only	2:59:32pm	at	the	moment	of	utterance	is	closer	to	the	truth	than	an	
utterance	of	“It	is	1:30pm	now”.	Or,	if	Newton’s	theory	is	not	strictly	true,	it	is	(so	it	seems)	much	
closer	to	the	truth	about	laws	of	motion	than	Aristotle’s	views	on	the	subject.	Truthlikeness	is	
thus	a	semantic	notion	having	to	do	with	“closeness”	or	similarity	between	contents;	it	is	not	an	
epistemic	notion	concerning	our	relation	to	such	contents.	It	is	important	to	keep	these	different	
meanings	of	“close	to	the	truth”	apart.		
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develops	a	notion	of	closeness	to	the	truth	in	two	steps.	Section	3	mentions	some	ways	
in	which	this	notion	is	useful.		
	
1.	Getting	Things	Right	
According	to	a	currently	much	supported	view	about	knowledge,	the	safety	view	(see,	
e.g.,	Sosa	1999),	a	safe	true	belief	that	p	amounts	to	knowledge	that	p.3	Here	is	a	basic	
explanation	of	the	safety	of	a	true	belief:	
	
(Belief-Safety)	A	true	belief	that	p	is	safe	just	in	case	in	all	(or	most)	close	possible	
worlds	in	which	the	subject	believes	that	p,	using	the	same	method	of	belief	
acquisition	as	in	the	actual	case,	p	is	the	case.		
	
Now,	a	subject	might	believe	a	necessary	truth	for	all	the	wrong	reasons	or	on	the	basis	
of	using	generally	unreliable	methods.	In	order	to	prevent	such	a	subject	from	being	
qualified	as	a	safe	believer	that	p	or	a	knower	that	p,	many	adherents	of	the	safety	view	
add	a	further	condition	into	(Belief-Safety)	(or	to	the	conditions	for	knowledge):		
	
(Method-Safety)	A	method	used	in	the	acquisition	of	a	true	belief	that	p	is	safe	just	
in	case	use	of	the	method	in	all	(or	most)	close	possible	worlds	leads	to	true	
beliefs	of	the	same	kind4	as	the	belief	that	p.		
	
	
3	 This	is	a	very	basic	and	rough	form	of	the	view	but	we	need	not	concern	us	with	whistles	and	
bells	here.	The	same	holds	for	all	the	other	conditions	and	explanations	that	I	will	present	below.	
–	If	safety	requires	truth	of	the	belief	in	the	actual	world,	then	we	can	also	simply	say	that	safe	
belief	is	knowledge.		
4	 We	can	and	need	to	leave	aside	questions	concerning	the	individuation	of	kinds	of	beliefs.		
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Tracking	or	sensitivity	theories	of	knowledge	(see	Dretske	1971	and	Nozick	1981)	
antedate	safety	theories	amongst	modal	forms	of	reliabilism.5	Finally,	there	is	also	a	
non-modal,	probabilistic	form	of	reliabilism.6	For	ease	of	exposition,	and	without	
prejudice,	we	can	focus	here	on	the	safety	version	(see	the	parallels	in	the	footnotes).	-	
So	much	for	the	basic	forms	of	reliabilism.		
	
2.	Far	from	the	Truth,	Somewhat	Close,	and	Close	
Now,	what	about	false	beliefs?	It	seems	that,	like	true	beliefs,	false	beliefs	can	also	be	
either	safely	or	unsafely	false,	sensitively	or	non-sensitively	false,	or	reliably	or	
unreliably	false.	Suppose	I’m	counting	beans.	I’m	usually	pretty	good	at	this	kind	of	
thing	but	this	time	I’m	distracted	by	an	explosion	and	count	one	bean	twice:	there	are	
72	but	I	count	73.	So,	I	acquire	a	false	belief	that	there	are	73	beans	in	front	of	me.	Since	
	
5	 According	to	Nozick	(see	1981,	172-196),	a	true	belief	is	knowledge	(if	and)	only	if	it	meets	two	
conditions,	a	variation	and	an	adherence	condition:	
(Belief-Sensitivity-v)	A	true	belief	that	p	is	sensitive-v	just	in	case	in	all	(or	most)	close	
possible	worlds	in	which	not	p,	the	subject	(using	the	same	method	as	in	the	actual	case)	
doesn’t	believe	that	p;		
(Belief-Sensitivity-a)	A	true	belief	that	p	is	sensitive-a	just	in	case	in	all	(or	most)	close	
possible	worlds	in	which	p,	the	subject	(using	the	same	method	as	in	the	actual	case)	does	
believe	that	p.		
Again,	one	might	want	to	add	conditions	of	method	sensitivity:	
(Method-Sensitivity-v)	A	method	used	in	the	acquisition	of	a	true	belief	that	p	is	sensitive-v	
just	in	case	in	all	(or	most)	close	possible	worlds	in	which	p	or	a	proposition	of	the	same	
kind	as	p	is	false	the	subject	does	not,	using	that	method,	come	to	believe	that	proposition;	
(Method-Sensitivity-a)	A	method	used	in	the	acquisition	of	a	true	belief	that	p	is	sensitive-a	
just	in	case	in	all	(or	most)	close	possible	worlds	in	which	p	or	a	proposition	of	the	same	
kind	as	p	is	true	the	subject	does,	using	that	method,	come	to	believe	that	proposition.	
I	am	using	the	term	“sensitivity”	like	“tracking”	and	for	both	conditions,	in	contrast	to	Nozick’s	
use	of	the	term.	I	am	not	aiming	at	the	most	correct	interpretation	of,	say,	Nozick	here	but	
rather	at	capturing	the	core	of	the	idea	of	sensitivity.	
6	 This	requires	something	different	for	knowledge:	
(Belief-Reliability)	A	true	belief	that	p,	resulting	from	the	use	of	a	certain	method	M,	is	
reliable	just	in	case	the	probability	of	ending	up	with	a	true	belief	about	whether	p	is	high,	
given	that	one	uses	M.		
Here	is	a	corresponding	condition	for	method-reliability:	
(Method-Reliability)	A	method	used	in	the	acquisition	of	a	true	belief	that	p	is	reliable	just	in	
case	use	of	the	method	for	finding	out	whether	p	or	a	proposition	of	the	same	kind	is	true	
has	a	high	probability	of	leading	to	a	true	belief	about	the	matter.		
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I	could	have	easily	been	right	about	this,	my	belief	fails	to	meet	a	safety	condition	for	
false	belief:	
	
(Inverse	Belief-Safety)	A	false	belief	that	p	is	inversely	safe	just	in	case	in	all	(or	
most)	close	possible	worlds	in	which	the	subject	believes	that	p,	using	the	same	
method	as	in	the	actual	case,	p	is	false.		
	
Perhaps	my	belief	violates	this	condition	–	perhaps	there	could	have	been	one	more	
bean	on	the	table.	But	perhaps	not.	(Inverse	Belief-Safety)	is	not	(always)	easy	to	apply.	
It	is	therefore	more	plausible	and	seems	more	important	and	relevant	here	that	I	fail	to	
meet	a	certain	safety	condition	for	the	method	used:	
	
(Inverse	Method-Safety)	A	method	used	in	the	acquisition	of	a	false	belief	that	p	is	
inversely	safe	just	in	case	use	of	the	method	in	all	(or	most)	close	possible	worlds	
leads	to	false	beliefs	of	the	same	kind	as	the	belief	that	p.7	
	
In	the	bean	case	above	I	could	have	easily	ended	up	with	a	true	belief.	I	was	wrong	but	
not	very	stably	wrong:	I	failed	to	meet	(Inverse	Method-Safety).8	
	
7	 It	is	possible	that	two	methods	M1	and	M2	are	both	inversely	method-safe	but	one	(M1)	is	much	
“closer	to	the	truth”	in	the	sense	of	truthlikeness	(see	fn.2	above)	than	the	other.	For	instance,	my	
way	of	estimating	spatial	distance	(M1)	might	be	slightly	off	and	systematically	lead	to	a	small	
deviation	from	the	truth	whereas	my	way	of	estimating	the	success	of	political	candidates	(M2,	
driven,	say,	by	wishful	thinking)	systematically	leads	me	to	grossly	incorrect	beliefs	about	the	
matter.	It	is	obvious	that	M1	is	better	in	an	important	respect	than	M2.	However,	here	I	am	not	
dealing	with	the	virtues	of	truthlikeness	(see	above)	but	with	the	different	virtue	of	being	close	to	
the	truth	in	the	sense	discussed	here.	Thanks	to	NN	who	pressed	me	on	this	point.		
8	 We	can	describe	the	above	bean	counting	case	also	by	using	notions	of	inverse	sensitivity:	
(Inverse	Belief-Sensitivity-v)	A	false	belief	that	p	is	inversely	sensitive-v	just	in	case:	In	all	
(or	most)	close	possible	worlds	in	which	p	is	true,	the	subject	(using	the	same	method	as	in	
the	actual	case)	doesn’t	believe	that	p;		
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All	this	suggests	a	very	preliminary	notion	of	being	somewhat	though	not	too	close	
(close~)	to	the	truth:	A	subject	is	reliably	close~	to	the	truth	just	in	case	they	violate	
inverse	reliability	conditions.	Neglecting	the	differences	between	the	different	types	of	
closeness	(safety,	sensitivity,	probabilism)	we	could	simply	talk	about	being	close~	to	
the	truth	(in	whatever	specific	way).	If	we	can	have	a	good	unique	metric	for	modal	
closeness	of	worlds	or	a	good	unique	probabilistic	ranking,	then	we	can	have	a	metric	
for	closeness~	to	the	truth.	Having	such	a	metric	would	be	useful	and	interesting	in	
many	ways.		
	
However,	the	notion	of	closeness	to	the	truth	just	proposed	is	still	too	weak	(though	
somewhat	“close	to	the	truth”	in	a	different	sense:	see	fn.1,2).	If,	for	instance,	a	subject	
violates	any	of	the	above	inverse	conditions	they	might	still	get	things	wrong	in	many	
cases	and	get	it	right	in	many	but	not	in	almost	or	nearly	almost	all	cases.	Intuitively,	we	
wouldn’t	count	these	cases	as	being	(really)	close	to	the	truth.	Hence,	we	should	
	
(Inverse	Belief-Sensitivity-a)	A	false	belief	that	p	is	inversely	sensitive-a	just	in	case:	In	all	
(or	most)	close	possible	worlds	in	which	not	p	is	true,	the	subject	(using	the	same	method	as	
in	the	actual	case)	does	believe	that	p.		
My	false	bean	belief	failed	to	meet	either	of	these	conditions.	One	can	also	characterize	my	false	
belief	as	failing	to	meet	inverse	method	sensitivity	conditions:	
(Inverse	Method-Sensitivity-v)	A	method	used	in	the	acquisition	of	a	false	belief	that	p	is	
inversely	sensitive-v	just	in	case	in	all	(or	most)	close	possible	worlds	in	which	p	or	a	
proposition	of	the	same	kind	as	p	is	true	the	subject	does	not,	using	that	method,	come	to	
believe	that	proposition;	
(Inverse	Method-Sensitivity-a)	A	method	used	in	the	acquisition	of	a	false	belief	that	p	is	
inversely	sensitive-a	just	in	case	in	all	(or	most)	close	possible	worlds	in	which	p	or	a	
proposition	of	the	same	kind	as	p	is	false	the	subject	does,	using	that	method,	come	to	
believe	that	proposition.		
Finally,	we	can	also	express	things	in	terms	of	inverse	reliability:		
(Inverse	Belief-Reliability)	A	false	belief	that	p,	resulting	from	the	use	of	a	certain	method	M,	
is	inversely	reliable	just	in	case	the	probability	of	ending	up	with	a	false	belief	about	
whether	p	is	high,	given	that	one	uses	M;	
(Inverse	Method-Reliability)	A	method	used	in	the	acquisition	of	a	false	belief	that	p	is	
inversely	reliable	just	in	case	use	of	the	method	for	finding	out	whether	p	or	a	proposition	of	
the	same	kind	is	true	has	a	high	probability	of	leading	to	a	false	belief	about	the	matter.		
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strengthen	the	conditions	for	being	close	to	the	truth	(or	briefly”	being	“close”)	further	
in	the	following	way:	
	
(Safe	Belief-Closeness)	A	false	belief	that	p	is	safely	close	just	in	case	in	all	(or	
most)	close	possible	worlds	in	which	the	subject	believes	that	p,	using	the	same	
method	as	in	the	actual	case,	p	is	true;	
	
(Safe	Method-Closeness)	A	method	used	in	the	acquisition	of	a	false	belief	that	p	is	
safely	close	just	in	case	use	of	the	method	in	all	(or	most)	close	possible	worlds	
leads	to	true	beliefs	of	the	same	kind	as	the	belief	that	p.9		
	
Let	us	then	take	being	close	to	the	truth	(or	just:	“being	close”)	to	consist	in	meeting	
such	conditions.	We	can	leave	the	question	open	here	which	one	of	the	above	conditions	
one	should	choose	as	the	definitive	notion	of	being	close	to	the	truth;	perhaps	each	of	
	
9	 Here	are	the	parallel	conditions	for	the	other	forms	of	reliabilism:	
(Sensitive-v	Belief-Closeness)	A	false	belief	that	p	is	sensitively-v	close	just	in	case:	In	all	(or	
most)	close	possible	worlds	in	which	p	is	true,	the	subject	(using	the	same	method	as	in	the	
actual	case)	does	believe	that	p;		
(Sensitive-a	Belief-Closeness)	A	false	belief	that	p	is	sensitively-a	close	just	in	case:	In	all	(or	
most)	close	possible	worlds	in	which	not	p	is	true,	the	subject	(using	the	same	method	as	in	
the	actual	case)	does	believe	that	not	p;	
(Sensitive-v	Method-Closeness)	A	method	used	in	the	acquisition	of	a	false	belief	that	p	is	
sensitively-v	close	just	in	case	in	all	(or	most)	close	possible	worlds	in	which	p	or	a	
proposition	of	the	same	kind	as	p	is	true	the	subject	does,	using	that	method,	come	to	believe	
that	proposition;	
(Sensitive-a	Method-Closeness)	A	method	used	in	the	acquisition	of	a	false	belief	that	p	is	
sensitively-a	close	just	in	case	in	all	(or	most)	close	possible	worlds	in	which	p	or	a	
proposition	of	the	same	kind	as	p	is	false	the	subject	does,	using	that	method,	come	to	believe	
the	negation	of	that	proposition;		
(Reliable	Belief-Closeness)	A	false	belief	that	p,	resulting	from	the	use	of	a	certain	method	M,	
is	reliably	close	just	in	case	the	probability	of	ending	up	with	a	true	belief	about	whether	p	is	
high,	given	that	one	uses	M;	
(Reliable	Method	Closeness)	A	method	used	in	the	acquisition	of	a	false	belief	that	p	is	
reliably	close	just	in	case	use	of	the	method	for	finding	out	whether	p	or	a	proposition	of	the	
same	kind	is	true	has	a	high	probability	of	leading	to	a	true	belief	about	the	matter.		
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them	has	its	use	in	some	contexts.	The	above	conditions	reformulate	the	original	
reliability	conditions	for	the	case	of	a	false	belief.		
	
	
3.	Why	Getting	Close	Is	Interesting	
As	pointed	out	above,	the	notion	of	being	close	to	the	truth	plays	an	important	role	in	
epistemic	evaluation	in	general.	We	can	imagine	adding	a	comparative	notion	of	being	
closer	to	the	truth	and	putting	that	to	work	in	comparative	epistemic	evaluations	(“Jo	
was	pretty	close	to	the	truth	but	Mo	was	even	closer”).	We	can	also	imagine	adding	a	
graded	notion	of	being	close	to	the	truth	and	putting	that	to	work	in	more	fine-grained	
epistemic	evaluations	(“Jo	was	very	close	to	the	truth”).10	
	
There	are	also	some	other	advantages	of	having	a	good	idea	of	closeness:	It	can	help	
understand	an	important	type	of	Gettier	cases	better,	namely	those	in	which	the	
subject’s	belief	is	based	on	some	false	premise.	Take,	for	instance,	Gettier’s	original	case	
about	Smith	(see	Gettier	1963,	122-123)	who	justifiedly	but	falsely	believes	that	Jones	
owns	a	Ford	and	infers	from	this	the	true	disjunction	that	either	Jones	owns	a	Ford	or	
Brown	is	in	Barcelona	(where	Smith	has	no	reason	to	believe	the	second,	true	disjunct).	
No	matter	whether	Smith	is	close	to	the	truth	or	not,	he	doesn’t	know	the	disjunction.	
Interestingly,	however,	if	he	had	not	even	been	close	to	the	truth	of	the	first	disjunct	(for	
instance,	if	he	had	just	made	a	wild	guess	about	Jones’	Ford	ownership),	then	we	would	
not	consider	him	to	be	justified	and	thus	also	not	gettiered.11	We	only	do	count	Smith	as	
	
10	 This	requires	a	good	metric	for	closeness	of	possible	worlds	which,	some	say,	is	very	hard	to	get	
(if	at	all	possible).		
11	 What	if	Smith	is	confused	about	Jones	or	Fords	(say,	typically	mistakes	Jones	for	Miller	and	Fords	
for	Buicks)?	Is	he	still	thinking	or	talking	about	Jones	or	some	Ford?	We	can	leave	this	
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justified	and	in	a	Gettier	case	because	he	was	close	to	the	truth.	More	precisely:	Smith	is	
in	a	Gettier	case	because	he	is	method-close	to	the	truth,	whether	in	a	safe,	sensitive	or	
reliabilist12	way.		
	
This	is,	however,	not	the	whole	picture	yet.	Consider	a	type	of	cases	used	by	some	to	
show	that	there	can	be	knowledge	from	falsehood	(see,	e.g.,	Warfield	2005).	In	
Warfield’s	well-known	handout	case	a	person	brings	100	handouts	to	their	talk,	counts	
people	in	the	room	and,	inadvertently	counting	one	person	twice,	ends	up	with	the	
wrong	result	that	there	are	53	persons	in	the	room	(instead	of	52).	From	this	falsehood	
the	person	infers	that	they	have	a	sufficient	number	of	handouts	with	them.	Does	the	
person	thereby	come	to	know	that	they	have	a	sufficient	number	of	handouts	with	
them?	Supporters	of	a	positive	answer	face	the	challenge	of	explaining	how	this	can	be	
true	and	why	in	the	typical	Gettier	cases	inferring	a	true	proposition	from	a	false	one	
does	not	lead	to	knowledge	(see	Bernecker	forthcoming).	Even	if	one	denies	that	in	
cases	like	Warfield’s	the	subject	can	come	to	know	the	conclusion,	one	would	still	have	
to	explain	what	the	relevant	difference	between	Gettier	cases	and	alleged	knowledge-
from-falsehood	cases	(which	are	not	Gettier	cases)	is.		
	
Now,	one	important	difference	between	these	two	cases	is	that	in	the	latter	case	a	less	
precise	method	was	available	to	the	subject	such	that	the	subject	would	have	arrived	at	
the	true	conclusion	by	using	that	less	precise	method.	For	instance,	the	subject	could	
have	made	rough	but	unrisky	estimates	(rather	than	counted)	and	reasoned,	for	
	
complicated	question	aside	here	since	it	doesn’t	affect	the	main	point	here	and	only	complicates	
our	view	of	Gettier	cases.	Thanks	to	NN	here.		
12	 It	is	not	clear	at	all	whether	Smith	is	safely	or	sensitively	belief-close.	–	In	the	case	of	reliabilism,	
one	could	also,	arguably,	use	belief-closeness	as	a	condition.	I	am	leaving	this	complication	aside	
here.	
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instance,	in	the	following	way:	“There	are	at	most	15	people	over	there,	at	most	20	over	
there,	and,	finally,	certainly	not	more	than	30	people	over	there;	this	is	still	way	below	
100;	hence,	I	have	a	sufficient	number	of	handouts.”	In	contrast	to	this,	there	is	no	such	
less	precise	method	available	to	the	subject	in	Gettier	cases	involving	false	premises.	
This	suggests	the	following	characterization	of	false-premise	Gettier	cases	(especially	
since	no	other	relevant	difference	is	to	be	noticed	here):	
	
A	justified	true	belief	based	upon	and	dependent	on	a	false	premise	is	a	gettiered	
belief	only	if	the	subject’s	belief	in	the	false	premise	is	method-close	to	the	truth	
and	there	was	no	less	precise	method	available	to	the	subject.		
	
We	could	strengthen	the	right-hand	side	and	formulate	a	bi-conditional.	However,	I	
prefer	to	leave	it	open	here	whether	the	above	already	identifies	necessary	and	
sufficient	conditions.	My	aim	is	rather	to	show	that	a	notion	of	closeness	to	the	truth	can	
help	us	also	with	the	understanding	of	Gettier	cases	and	thus,	indirectly,	of	knowledge.		
	
The	above	explanation	of	false	lemma	cases	won’t,	however,	help	much	with	stopped	
clock	or	fake	barn	cases	(see	Russell	1948,	98	and	Goldman	1992,	86)	where	it	is	not	
clear	that	any	false	belief	is	involved	and	where	the	gettierization	is	not	based	on	the	
use	of	false	premises.	But	as	we	can	see,	the	idea	of	closeness	to	the	truth	can	help	with	
some	Gettier-cases.	More	generally:	Even	if	a	notion	of	closeness	to	the	truth	does	not	
help	us	with	all	kinds	of	problems	in	epistemology,	it	can	help	us	with	some.	And	this	is	
close	enough.		
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